The paper examines the random preference model, which can explain inherent variability of preferences in managerial and individual decision-making, and provides axiomatizations for the utility components of two such models di¤erentiated by the structure of core preferences: expected utility and betweenness-like preferences. We then examine the possibility of violations of weak stochastic transitivity for these models and for a model with core dual-EU preferences. Such violations correspond to the existence of Condorcet cycles and, therefore, the analysis has implications for managerial decision-making and for majority rule voting.
Introduction
Transitivity of preferences is at the core of most models of decision-making. It is also frequently cast in normative light on the grounds that decision-makers with transitive preferences, whether they are individuals or organizations, are immune to money pumps (Danan 2010 ). Yet it is common to encounter a pattern of choices that may suggest intransitive behavior (Tversky 1969 ). For example, three pairwise choices may exhibit a pattern where alternative x is chosen over alternative y once, alternative y is chosen over alternative z once, yet alternative z is chosen over alternative x once. Groups of individuals, such as management teams and boards of directors, that use majority voting to choose between pairs of alternatives, may also be prone to making intransitive choices (Condorcet, 1785) .
At the same time, both individual and group choices exhibit substantial degree of variability. On the individual level, there exists an abundant experimental evidence of decisionmakers who choose a given lottery A over a certain sum x while, not much later, choose to accept a smaller sum y over the same lottery A. Moreover, in retrospect, decision-makers are often not bothered by these seemingly contradicting choices. The observation that decisionmakers frequently act di¤erently on similar occasions of choices, even when faced with conditions that are deliberately crafted to be identical, has focused some of the economics and psychology literature on …nding explanations for this 'within-subject'variability of choices (Hey, 1995 , Otter et al., 2008 . Such variability naturally arises when the decision-making entity is comprised of several individuals, as in the case of decision-making by management teams and social choice problems (see the illustrative example in Section 2). This suggests that in order to accommodate the observed variability that is exhibited by decision-makers over time, contexts, and occasions, the assumption that choices are deterministic must be relaxed.
Several competing theories have been proposed to explain non-deterministic behavior.
In this paper we focus on the random preference model (Luce and Suppes 1965; see also Loomes and Sugden 1995) because it frequently outperforms the other models and because it is considered to be one of the most promising among them (see, e.g., Regenwetter, Dana and Davis-Stober 2011, Cavagnaro and Davis-Stober 2013). 1 In the random preference model, a decision-maker has a set of deterministic transitive preference orders, called core preferences, and on each choice occasion the selection of an alternative is based on a preference order that may seem to be drawn according to some probability distribution over the set of core preferences. For management teams, the deterministic preference relations represent the various team members. For individual decision-makers, they may correspond to di¤erent states of mind or re ‡ect various parameters that are hidden from an outside observer. When a decision-maker weighs up various attributes of a choice problem, it may seem as if her decision-making pendulum swings in one direction on one occasion and in the other direction on another occasion. 2 Thus, the random preference approach allows for certain variation in a decision-maker's evaluation of di¤erent alternatives. These variations may entail seemingly intransitive behavior even though all of the core preferences are transitive.
The existing literature provides very little axiomatic footing for the random preference model. This limits the practical exports of the model by hindering hypothesis generation and further development of theory. We …ll this gap in the literature by providing axiomatizations for the utility components of two classes of models with multiple core preferences. The two classes are di¤erentiated by the structure of core preferences. The …rst class of models entails core preferences that have an expected utility form. These models are the most common ones in this literature. The second class entails a more general set of core preferences satisfying the betweenness property (Chew 1989 and Dekel 1986 ). The need for this extension arises from consistently observed violations of the independence axiom, which is the corner stone of all expected utility models. In addition to these two classes of preference structures, we analyze random preference models where core preferences have dual expected utility form (see Quiggin 1982 and Yaari 1987) , which is particularly useful for analyzing portfolio choice problems.
The framework developed here is directly applicable to the model of Csaszar and Eggers (2013) which compares three decision-making mechanisms frequently used by management 1 Regenwetter et al. (2011) utilize the term mixture model instead of the random preference model. 2 There are several alternative interpretations of random choice models including limited cognitive ability and limited attention.
teams. They study the performance of majority voting, delegation, and averaging of opinions in a dynamic model with di¤erential ‡ows of information across team members. All of the team members in their model have the same preferences but di¤erent knowledge base. In our framework, the reverse holds but the tools developed here can be easily implemented in their framework. Furthermore, the delegation procedure in Csaszar and Eggers (2013) is in exact correspondence to the model developed in the present paper.
To empirically isolate systematic violations of transitivity and, at the same time, to account for the intrinsic variability in choice behavior, the literature has put forth several probabilistic analogues of transitivity. In this paper we study weak stochastic transitivity (WST) (Vail 1953, Davidson and Marschak 1959) , which has a prominent role among these analogues. Assume there exists a probability distribution over the set of core preferences and let (X Y ) denote the probability that the preference chosen ranks X over While it is widely acknowledged that the random preference model can violate WST (see, e.g., Fishburn 1999 , Regenwetter et al. 2011 ), very little is known about the domain restrictions for choice alternatives and core preferences that lead to satisfaction of WST. We contribute to this literature by relating potential violations of WST to the "commonality"of core preferences and "dimensionality" of the choice problem. We show that WST is always satis…ed when the set of possible outcomes does not exceed three and all core preferences rank the basic outcomes similarly or share the same risk attitude. When the outcomes are real numbers, this occurs when all core preferences are monotonic with respect to …rst-order stochastic dominance or are either all risk averse or all risk loving. We also demonstrate that when the set of possible outcomes is greater than three, violations of WST are possible even if one assumes both types of commonality of core preferences.
Y (see Section 4). Then WST requires that, if (X Y
Although this dimensionality restriction may seem overly restrictive, it is pertinent for a number of popular experiments. We demonstrate it by examining an experiment that consists of a sequence of 2-alternative forced choices where for each element of the sequence a decision-maker chooses between a …xed binary lottery and some certain amount of money There is another practical bene…t from identifying conditions under which WST is expected to hold for the random preference model. Violations of WST are problematic for elicitation of net bene…ts to inform various organizational policies because they may lead to systematic cyclic choices. If cycles are likely, then policy prescriptions may be sensitive to the speci…cs of an elicitation procedure including the sequence of choices made during the procedure and whether di¤erent policies are compared directly or indirectly, e.g. through their elicited certainty equivalents.
Our interest in WST also stems from its central role in collective choice. When a group of individuals uses Condorcet's procedure, i.e., a sequential choice between pairs of alternatives via majority voting, WST is equivalent to the absence of Condorcet cycles. 3 If a cycle exists then, for example, the member of a management team that sets the agenda for sequentially discarding alternatives via majority voting will be able to induce any alternative in the cycle as the overall winner of Condorcet's procedure. Our dimensionality and commonality conditions illuminate when such agenda setting can be avoided. These conditions are di¤erent from the existing conditions, such as single-peakedness, value restriction, and net value restriction, that ensure transitivity of collective choice using Condorcet's procedure (see, e.g., Gehrlein, 1981 Gehrlein, , 1997 Gehrlein, , 2002 Gehrlein and Fishburn, 1980 ; Gehrlein and Lepelley, 1997; 3 A Condorcet cycle materializes when a majority of the voters choose alternative A over B, B over C, but C over A. Mueller, 2003; Riker, 1982; Sen, 1969 Sen, , 1970 Sen, , 1999 Tangian, 2000) .
We structure the paper as follows. We begin by presenting an illustrative example which is used to motivate our modeling approach and to demonstrate our …ndings in a later section of the paper. Then, we introduce the framework and present the two representation theorems.
We proceed to explore the implications of commonality of core preferences for violations of WST. We then derive implications of our analysis for two experimental settings. After providing an analysis of selected cases of core non-EU preferences, we conclude with some …nal remarks.
Illustrative Example
Consider the following choice problem faced by a team of top managers of a company producing electronic tablets and mobile phones. The choice problem pertains to an allocation of a …xed advertising budget between the …rm's two product lines. Suppose, for concreteness sake, the team makes this decision on a monthly basis, the monthly advertising budget is US$30m, and every month the team chooses between two of the following three options. 4 Under option A, $20m is spent on advertising the tablets while the rest is spent on phone ads. Option B is characterized by an equal expenditure on ads for the two product lines.
Finally, under option C, $13m is spent on tablet ads and $17m on phone ads.
Naturally, each of these three options involves a considerable level of uncertainty. It is hard to envision a scenario where the management team can perfectly forecast whether an ad will work and, more generally, what the precise e¤ect of di¤erent advertisement expenditures will be. Thus, the selection process is akin to a choice from a set of lotteries.
To demonstrate, suppose that for each product type there are two possible changes in that product's revenue net of all costs except for advertising. The feasible changes in the revenue for the tablets are $14m and $22m. For the phones, the feasible changes in the revenue are $12m and $20m. Thus, there are four possible contingencies, y 1 =($14m,$12m), y 2 =($14m,$20m), y 3 =($22m,$12m) and y 4 =($22m,$20m). Which of these four contingen- 4 We assume away learning that might take place between di¤erent occasions of the choice problem and other forms of history dependence.
cies materializes is uncertain. Each of the three options i = A; B; C results in some distinct probability distribution p i = (p Option C : ($1m,-$5m) ; p
where, for example, the …rst element under option B corresponds to y 1 ($15m,$15m).
The team may have di¤erent rankings of the three alternatives on di¤erent occasions of the choice problem. A plethora of characteristics unobservable to an outside observer may contribute to the attractiveness of di¤erent options to the team. In addition to uncertainties surrounding the team's deliberation process on each occasion, the unobservable characteristics may include market conditions, behavior of competitors, and new innovations that occur over the period of repeated decision-making. For simplicity of interpretation, imagine a scenario where this information pertains to "exogenous" factors, such as long-run market share, image, and reputation, rather than probabilities of di¤erent outcomes and associated net pro…ts. This information may change the ranking of the three options even without a¤ecting the way they are seen by an outside observer (that is, the representations that appear in (1)). Suppose that, on certain occasions of binary choice, the team may possess information that favors spending most of the budget on advertising the tablets. In this case, which is called core preference ABC; the team strictly prefers option A to B to C. On other occasions, the team may have information suggesting that equally sharing the budget is the best option and that spending on phone ads is a strictly better investment than spending on tablet ads. In this case, which is called core preference BCA; the team strictly prefers option B to C to A. Note that both preference rankings ABC and BCA are transitive. Suppose that on each choice occasion the team's core preference is drawn according to distribution ( ) whose support is given by the core preferences ABC and BCA:
Consider now the following sequence of pairwise choices by the team. When choosing between options A and B; core preference ABC is realized and, as a result, the team picks option A. On a di¤erent occasion, when the team's choice set is comprised of options B and C, the realization of the core preference is again ABC and, consequently, the team chooses option B. Finally, when the team chooses between options A and C, the realization of the core preference is BCA and, hence, the team's choice is C. Formally, this sequence of decisions exhibits non-transitivity or, in other words, forms a cycle: option A is chosen over B, B is chosen over C, but C is chosen over A. This is in spite of the fact that the team chooses according to a transitive preference ranking on each choice occasion.
When the team uses the Condorcet procedure to choose among the three alternatives, WST is equivalent to the requirement of transitive collective preference of the team. After we introduce our model and present the results, we return to this section's example and the Condorcet procedure, in particular, to elucidate the implications of our formal …ndings.
Representation Theorems
We consider a …nite set of n distinct outcomes X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; :::; x n g, and the set L = (X) of all lotteries over it (with the induced topology of R n ). For a lottery p 2 L we use the notation p i = p (x i ). We consider decision-makers who, when confronted with a choice between two lotteries, must make up their mind and choose one of the two lotteries. This assumption re ‡ects many real life situations and it is in agreement with most experimental designs. A decision-maker (DM) is represented by a binary relation < over L with the interpretation that a lottery p is related to a lottery q if there are situations in which p is chosen over q. As an example consider a DM who, when asked to make a choice between two lotteries p and q, draws one utility from the set fu 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 g (de…ned over X) according to some probability distribution and may choose p if the expected utility of p is not smaller than that of q for the drawn utility. That is, p < q if there exists j = 1; 2; 3 such that
The strict asymmetric part and the symmetric part are de…ned as usual: p q if p < q and : (q < p); p q if both p < q and q < p. For the DM discussed above, p q if,
Probabilistic DMs with core Expected Utility preferences
We start with assumptions on < that characterize DMs of this type.
(A.1) (Completeness) For all p; q 2 L either p < q or q < p.
Completeness follows from our basic requirement that a choice must always be executed. It implies the equivalence of the two relations : < and . Note that transitivity of < is not assumed.
(A.2) (Continuity) For all q 2 L the sets fp 2 L jp < qg and fp 2 L jq < pg are closed.
(A.3) (Independence) For all p; q; r 2 L and 2 [0; 1],
This is the familiar independence axiom of the Expected Utility (EU) model. This axiom is closely related to the Independence axiom. It requires that if the lotteries p and r are strictly worse than q, then so is the compound lottery that either yields p with probability or r with probability 1 . It can be shown that given the other axioms, Mixture domination is equivalent to the transitivity of . Our preference for (A.4) stems from its role in proving our second, and more general, representation theorem. Lehrer and Teper (2011) use another equivalent assumption to derive a similar representation result in a di¤erent framework. The role of the set of possible utilities in our paper is played by the set of probabilities (or beliefs) in their paper. Heller (2012) provides a representation theorem that is closer to ours. In his framework, behavior is characterized by a choice correspondence.
In contrast, the present paper operates with rankings of two alternatives.
In the following we identify functions u 2 R X with (u (x 1 ) ; u (x 2 ) ; ::::; u (x n )) and, with slight abuse of notation, use u to denote this vector. The inner product in R n is denoted by ' '. We now state our …rst representation theorem.
Theorem 1 A binary relation < satis…es (A.1)-(A.4) if and only if there exists a closed
convex cone of utility functions U R n such that
Proof: See Appendix
Note that by taking negations of (2), the strict relation satis…es
To understand the structure of the set U note that if u satis…es the right hand side inequality of (2), then so does every function v that is derived from u through multiplication by a positive scalar (that is, v = au, for some a > 0). This explains why U is a cone.
Similarly, convexity of U is a consequence of the weak inequality on the right hand side of (2) . Finally, it is easy to verify that any positive a¢ ne transformation of u (v = au + t, a > 0 and t arbitrary) would also satisfy the right hand side of (2). This illustrates why, following Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok (2004), two cones U and U 0 satisfy (2) if and only if the closure of the set fu + teju 2 U; t 2 Rg is equal to that of the set fu
(where e = (1; :::; 1)). This property generalizes the uniqueness property (up to positive a¢ ne transformation) of the classical expected utility theorem.
Few special cases of the structure of the set U are worth mentioning. At one extreme is the case U = R n ; so that the cone U consists of all real functions de…ned on X. Under this scenario, < is trivial in the sense that p q for all p; q 2 L (for every p and q it is possible to …nd u satisfying u p > u q and u 0 satisfying the converse inequality) and, moreover, < is transitive. Another extreme case materializes when the cone U is a ray. This is the only situation in which < is transitive while is non-trivial and is, in fact, the standard, transitive, EU preference (in which case there is no real randomness over U). Two other interesting cases emerge when the set of alternatives satis…es X R (i.e., all x i 's are sums of money). If U consists of all strictly increasing functions then, by (3) , is equal to the strong …rst-order stochastic dominance partial relation > 1 de…ned by
q i for all j=1; :::; n 1;
where we assume, without loss of generality, that x 1 < x 2 < < x n . Similarly, if U consists of all concave functions then is equal to a strong version of the second-order stochastic dominance partial relation.
We will call a DM who acts as if she draws a utility function from a given set of utilities a Probabilistic DM (denoted PDM). To re ‡ect the fact that PDMs who are characterized by Theorem 1 satisfy the Independence axiom, we refer to them as PDMs with core EU preferences. The set U is called the PDM's core utilities. In Sections 4 and 5 we supplement the preference structure with an additional component, a probability distribution over U such that the PDM draws a utility function from U according to and subsequently makes her decision based on the drawn utility. Our modeling of the probability distribution function may seem rather ad hoc in the sense that it is not generated by some behavioral axioms similar to those presented above. However, our results in Sections 4 and 5 hold for all probability distribution functions .
The existing literature does o¤er some representation results along these lines but in di¤erent, and often more complex, frameworks. This literature was originated by Kreps become the usual EU decision-makers when the transitivity of < is also required.
Our framework in this section is also related to recent models of incomplete preferences 
Probabilistic DMs with core Betweenness-like preferences
Similarly to the deterministic EU model, the model of a PDM with core EU preferences cannot be reconciled with a number of violations of the independence axiom observed in the lab. For example, let X = f0; 3000; 4000g and consider a PDM with core EU preferences who is …rst asked to choose between p = (0; 1; 0) (3000 for certain) and q = (0:2; 0; 0:8) (a lottery with a 0:8 chance of winning 4000) and then, independent of her …rst choice, between p = (0:75; 0:25; 0) (0:25 chance of winning 3000) and q = (0:8; 0; 0:2) (0:2 chance of winning 4000). Let be the PDM distribution over U and let = (u 2 U : u p > u q) be the probability of drawing a utility u that ranks lottery p strictly higher than lottery q. Since u p > u q if and only if u p > u q, the probability (u 2 U : u p > u q) is, by construction, also equal to . Hence, for this PDM and irrespective of the probability distribution , the probability that p is chosen from the …rst pair and q is chosen from the second pair must be equal to the probability that p is chosen from the second pair and q is chosen from the …rst pair, since both are equal to (1 ) : However, this contradicts persistent experimental evidence showing that the frequency of the choices p and q is statistically signi…cantly greater than the frequency of the choices p and q; which is immediately recognized as the famous common-ratio e¤ect.
To address such violations of the EU model, we turn to a more general representation theorem in which the utility set U still exists but depends on the lotteries at which choice is made. To accomplish this we replace the Independence axiom (A.3) with a weaker betweenness assumption:
(B.3) (Betweenness) For all p; q 2 L, r = p; q and 2 [0; 1],
To see that this assumption is essentially identical to the Betweenness axiom used in generalized EU models (see Chew 1989 and Dekel 1986) , note that, assuming transitivity, (B.3)
holds if and only if for all p; q 2 L, 2 [0; 1] and 2 (0; 1)
The statement in (B.3) was chosen because it emphasizes its relation to (A.3).
Theorem 2 A binary relation < satis…es (A.1), (A.2), (B.3) and (A.4) if and only if for
each q 2 L there exists a closed convex cone of utility functions U q such that for all p and q
The main di¤erence between this theorem and Theorem 1 is that here the cones U q can vary with the lottery q (see the example below). In addition, and similarly to Theorem 1, the cones U q are unique up to the a¢ ne operator described above. Finally, the strict relation
Example Let X = fx 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 g = f0; 1; 2g and let p i denote the probability of outcome x i : Also, let w (x 1 ) = w (x 3 ) = 0:5 and w (x 2 ) = 1: Consider the binary relation satisfying betweenness and de…ned by
where
is a weighted utility function and
is a function that ranks lotteries according to the expected value of the outcome. Both functions rank outcome 2 at the top and outcome 0 at the bottom. As can be seen in Figure   1 , drawn in the (p 1 ; p 3 ) plane (where p 2 = 1 p 1 p 3 is omitted), the cones U q vary with the lottery q. At q 0 = (0:25; 0:25), the cone U q 0 satis…es
The cone U 0 in Figure 1 ; with a vertex at q 0 and spanned by the utility vector u 0 = and is depicted as the cone with a vertex at q 000 .
Place Figure 1 here
We say that PDMs characterized by Theorem 2 have core Betweenness-like preferences.
This re ‡ects the role the Betweenness axiom plays in deriving the representation. It is immediate to verify that the PDMs of this section become the usual Betweenness decision-makers when the transitivity requirement on < is added to (A.1), (A,2), (B.3) and (A.4). Note however that, unlike the EU case, a PDM characterized by Theorem 2 may not necessarily be represented by a set of usual transitive Betweenness preferences. In fact, such representation cannot be achieved if transitivity of the strict relation is not assumed (see Safra, 2014 ).
WST with core EU preferences 4.1 Preliminaries
In this section we consider PDMs who are characterized by Theorem 1. That is, a typical PDM has core EU preferences given by a set of utilities U: To examine WST, we supplement the preference structure of the preceding section with an additional component, a probability distribution over U. The PDM draws a utility function from U according to before she makes her decision. 5 We denote the probability that lottery p 2 L is preferred to lottery q 2 L by (p q) = (u 2 U : u p > u q) : That is, the binary choice probability (p q) is the measure of the set of utilities for which the expected utility of p is strictly greater than the expected utility of q: In incomplete expected utility models, lottery p is chosen over lottery q if and only if the expected utility of p is strictly greater than the expected utility of q for all EU functions in U, i.e. Thus, WST requires that a PDM whose probability of choosing p over q is greater than 0:5 and probability of choosing q over r is greater than 0:5 will have a probability of choosing p over r that weakly exceeds 0:5: 6 WST has been one of the most prominent approaches as a probabilistic analogue for a deterministic choice model. 5 In what follows, it is assumed, without any loss of generality, that the support of is equal to U. 6 A typical de…nition of WST involves only weak inequalities. Our strict version is used to avoid nongeneric boundary cases. 7 Many studies in this strand su¤er from inappropriate statistical analysis and erroneous conclusions that
In our framework, WST can be violated unless a combination of restrictions is imposed on the probability distribution and on the set of feasible lotteries P: That is, absent such restrictions there exists a family of EU preferences, a probability distribution over that family, and a collection of three distinct lotteries that will lead to a violation of WST.
To illustrate, consider a Condorcet-like situation with the set of utilities u 1 = (3; 2; 1) ; u 2 = (1; 3; 2) ; u 3 = (2; 1; 3)
and the set P of degenerate lotteries
L, where e i is the ith unit vector of R
3
(hence a vertex of L). It is easy to verify that a uniform probability distribution over fu i g
violates WST with respect to P. Under the uniform distribution, the probability that the PDM will choose lottery e 1 over lottery e 2 is equal to ; the probability that the PDM will choose lottery e 2 over lottery e 3 is equal to ; while the probability that the PDM will choose lottery e 3 over lottery e 1 is also equal to ; 0; 0;
:
Note that the example demonstrates that single peakedness of preferences over the set of deterministic outcomes X does not preclude the possibility of encountering violations of WST in the much richer lottery space L.
Both of the above examples feature a …nite number of core preferences for the PDM.
Appendix contains an example with a continuum of core preferences that violates WST.
The literature on transitivity sometimes uses a di¤erent, geometric, approach to analyze WST. 9 To illustrate consider a (…xed) choice set consisting of three distinct lotteries p; q; r 2 L and assume, for simplicity, that only strict core preferences (over this set) are allowed.
Consider a PDM with a probability distribution over a set of core preferences U. Out of the 8 feasible complete core preferences over the set fp; q; rg, 6 correspond to the transitive (linear) orders 10 and 2 represent the Condorcet cycles ([p is preferred to q, q is preferred to r; but r is preferred to p] and [q is preferred to p, p is preferred to r; but r is preferred to q]). For any`;`0 2 fp; q; rg let P``0 denote the binary choice probability that`is preferred to`0: Following Iverson and Falmagne (1985) and Regenwetter et al. (2014) , we consider the unit cube of the 3-dimensional space where the axes are spanned by the probabilities P pq (which spans the …rst axis), P pr (the second axis) and P qr (the third axis); see Figure 2 panel (a). Each vertex of this cube corresponds to one of the 8 feasible core preferences. For example, the origin (0; 0; 0) corresponds to the transitive linear order for which r is preferred to both q and p, and q is preferred to p. The two Condorcet cycles correspond to the vertices (1; 0; 1) and (0; 1; 0). Next, denote pq = (p q), qr = (q r) ; pr = (p r) ; and 9 We are grateful to one of the reviewers for referring us to this analysis and for inducing us to clarify the relationship between this approach and the propositions of Section 4.2. 10 An example of a transitve linear order is a preference ranking such that p is preferred to both q and r, and q is preferred to r. = pq ; pr ; qr . It can be veri…ed that a PDM with a probability distribution satis…es WST if and only if the vector belongs to the unshaded area in Figure 2 panel (a) , that is, to the complement of the union of the two shaded half-cubes.
Place Figure 2 here
To see why WST is violated in the …rst example, consider the set of lotteries fe 1 ; e 2 ; e 3 g and note that the …rst core utility u 1 = (3; 2; 1) of the PDM corresponds to the vertex (1; 1; 1)
in the space of vectors (P e 1 e 2 ; P e 1 e 3 ; P e 2 e 3 ), the second core utility u 2 = (1; 3; 2) corresponds to the vertex (0; 0; 1) and the third utility u 3 = (2; 1; 3) corresponds to (1; 0; 0) (see Figure 2 panel (b)). Next observe that the uniform probability distribution 0 over these core utilities corresponds to the point 0 = ; the mid point of the triangle formed by the vertices ; the number of vertices is 2 ( n 2 ) , while the number of the transitive linear orders is just n!. Therefore, there are 2 ( n 2 ) n! many shaded half-unit hypercubes and hence the shaded volume converges to 1 as n tends to in…nity.
Thus, WST becomes exceedingly restrictive as n becomes arbitrarily large. 11 We elaborate on this in the next section.
A number of primitives can lead to the satisfaction of WST. One approach entails supplementing a transitive deterministic preference relation with an error structure. The models in this strand include the tremble model (Harless and Camerer, 1994 ) and the Fechner model (Fechner, 1860, Luce and Suppes, 1965, Hey and Orme, 1994). Another approach is to consider a probability measure over a set of core preferences and de…ne an aggregate preference using the Condorcet procedure; alternative p is preferred to q; denoted by , if and only if 11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point.
the measure of the set of core preferences for which p is preferred to q exceeds 0:5. Transitivity of the preference order is equivalent to WST except for boundary cases. A restriction on core preferences, such as single-peakedness or net value restriction, will ensure that WST holds. Our approach falls into this category of models. According to our knowledge, the domain restrictions studied in the present paper have not been identi…ed before. There are primitives leading to WST in addition to the formulations above. We omit their discussion due to space considerations.
As we have argued above, WST cannot be guaranteed without imposing restrictions on the probability distribution and/or the set of feasible lotteries P. Our main focus in the following subsection is in characterizing such conditions.
Commonality of preferences
Here we maintain the assumption that PDMs have core EU preferences but we restrict them to satisfy a certain property. First, we examine the case where all preferences in U agree with a certain linear order of the basic outcomes. Then, we suppose that all have similar risk attitudes (in the sense that will be de…ned below). Finally, we consider the implications of imposing both of these domain restrictions (agreement on common directions and similar risk attitudes).
Comonotonic preferences
Denote the EU preference relation for the utility function u 2 U by < u , where the asymmetric part is denoted by u : Suppose that all preference relations in U agree on the order of the basic outcomes. That is, there exists a permutation fi j g is desired. The main result here is that WST is satis…ed as long as the PDM is comonotonic and the set of available lotteries P is a subset of the set of all lotteries over three outcomes.
Proposition 4
Suppose there are no more than three outcomes. For all probability distributions ; comonotonic PDMs with core EU preferences and distribution function satisfy WST with respect to all sets P L.
Proof: See Appendix
It can be easily veri…ed that WST is satis…ed when P is a two-dimensional polygon and the PDM is comonotonic with respect to its vertices. Note also that the condition that there are no more than three outcomes is necessary. See the second example of Section 4.1 for a discrete U and Appendix for a continuous U.
Next we relate Proposition 4 to the geometric analysis presented in the previous section.
Fix n distinct lotteries in the feasible set L = (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ) and assume, without loss of generality, that x 1 u x 2 u x 3 for all u 2 U. By construction, the set of strict and transitive linear core preferences over the n lotteries that belong to U corresponds to a proper subset of the n! vertices which represent all possible transitive linear orders. Allowing for all possible probability distributions over the set of core preferences yields a convex polygon that is equal to the convex hull of these vertices. In order for Proposition 4 to hold, this convex polygon should have an empty intersection with the shaded subset of the hypercube that violates WST. However, as was explained in Section 4.1, for very large n the volume of the shaded subset becomes arbitrarily close to 1 while the volume of the subset that satis…es WST becomes arbitrarily close to 0. Since the latter set is not convex, it is not immediately clear how the convex polygon can be completely nested in it.
To grasp the intuition behind Proposition 4, consider …rst the case n = 3 and assume, for simplicity, that the three lotteries are given by p = e 2 ; q = 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) e 3 ; r = 2 e 1 + (1 2 ) e 3 , where 1 > 1 > 2 > 0. 12 By comonotonicity, all core preferences rank q over r and hence, for every possible probability distribution , we have qr = 1. Hence, in the space spanned by P pq ; P pr and P qr ; the analysis is restricted to a 2-dimensional face of the cube. Indeed, all three feasible transitive linear orders lie in this face: for the …rst transitive linear order, which corresponds to the vertex (1; 1; 1) in Figure 3 panel (a), p is 12 Note that every EU preference is uniquely determined by the lottery of the form 1 e 1 + (1 1 ) e 3 that is indi¤erent to e 2 .
preferred to both q and r; for the second, which corresponds to the vertex (0; 0; 1) ; both q and r are preferred to p; and for the third, which corresponds to the vertex (0; 1; 1) ; p is ranked between q and r. The polygon representing all possible probability distributions that satisfy the requirements of Proposition 4 is given by the triangle with vertices (0; 0; 1) ; (0; 1; 1) and (1; 1; 1) in Figure 3 panel (a) and, as can be seen in the …gure, it is nested in the subset of the cube that satis…es WST.
Place Figure 3 here
Next let n = 4 and, as above, consider four lotteries given by p = e 2 ; q = 1 e 1 +
( 1 1 
Again by comonotonicity, every possible probability distribution satis…es qr = 1, rs = 1
and qs = 1. Therefore, although in the space of binary choice probabilities the hypercube is of dimension 4 2 = 6, the relevant analysis is restricted to the 3-dimensional cube that is spanned by the choice probabilities P pq (…rst axis in Figure 3 panel (b)), P pr (second axis) and P ps (third axis). There are four feasible transitive linear orders: for the …rst order, p is preferred to q, r and s (this preference corresponds to the vertex (1; 1; 1) in Figure 3 panel (b)); for the second, both q; r and s are preferred to p (the vertex (0; 0; 0)); for the third, q is preferred to p while p is preferred to r and s (the vertex (0; 1; 1)); and, for the forth, q and r are preferred to p while p is preferred to s (the vertex (0; 0; 1)). As can be seen in the …gure, the 3-dimensional polygon created by these vertices is nested in the subset that satis…es WST.
For an arbitrary n and lotteries of the form p = e 2 and q i = i e 1 + (1 i ) e 3 , i = 1; :::; n 1 and 1 > 1 > > n 1 > 0, the relevant sub-hypercube is of dimension n 1 and, out of its 2 n 1 vertices, only n correspond to the feasible linear orders. Intuitively speaking, since these vertices are not 'spread out'over all faces of the relevant sub-hypercube (again, see Figure 3 panel (b)), the relevant n-dimensional polygon 'manages to avoid'intersecting with the shaded non-WST subset. For a more precise argument, note that a non-empty intersection of the polygon with the interior of the non-WST subset implies the existence of a probability distribution and three distinct lotteries p 0 ; q 0 ; r 0 2 p; fq i g But this cannot hold: at least two of the lotteries p 0 ; q 0 ; r 0 are of the form q i and q j , i < j and, by comonotonicity, all utilities must rank q i higher than q j .
Common risk attitude
In this subsection all x i 's are taken to be monetary outcomes and we use the common notion of risk aversion: a preference relation exhibits risk aversion (or, risk seeking) if the expected value of every non-degenerate lottery is strictly preferred (less preferred) to that lottery. This is equivalent to the strict concavity (convexity) of the corresponding utility function as well as to the PDM preference being strictly decreasing (increasing) with respect to mean-preserving spreads. PDMs for whom all core EU preferences display risk aversion (risk seeking) are called risk averse PDMs (risk seeking PDMs).
We use the structure imposed by common risk attitude to prove that, when the set P is a subset of the set of all lotteries over three outcomes, risk averse and risk seeking PDMs always satisfy WST.
Proposition 5 Suppose there are no more than three outcomes. For all probability distributions ; risk averse (risk seeking) PDMs with core EU preferences and distribution function satisfy WST with respect to all sets P L.
Proof: See Appendix
Finally, since separately requiring either comonotonicity or risk aversion (seeking) of core preferences ensures WST for any two-dimensional set P, a natural question to ask is whether requiring both warrants WST for sets of lotteries that are of dimension higher than 2. However, as the second example of Section 4.1 demonstrates, this is not the case (note that a PDM with the utilities of this example is comonotonic and risk averse). Thus, even if the dimension of P is as low as 3, a combination of comonotonicity and common risk attitude can not ensure that, for any probability distribution ; WST with distribution function will hold.
Experimental violations of WST
The empirical literature on possible violations of WST in experimental settings is rather vast. 13 However, a considerable share of this research is either purely descriptive with respect 5), when there are fewer than three outcomes, WST is satis…ed by any comonotonic or risk averse PDM with EU preferences. It turns out that for many popular experimental settings, the choice problems are e¤ectively two-dimensional.
In the following subsection, we present such an example: an experiment to elicit certainty equivalents of binary lotteries. We then relate violations of WST to the preference reversal phenomenon. In this section we maintain the assumptions that the outcomes are monetary, the PDM's core preferences are EU, and all their utility functions are increasing in income.
Experiments with binary choice lists
Consider a choice problem where a PDM chooses between a sure income of y and a non- For this experimental setup, the overall space is the Cartesian product of the interval y; y and the probability interval [0; 1], which is a 2-dimensional set. Since an element (y; p) 2 y; y [0; 1] represents the compound lottery (B; p; y; 1 p), the set of pairs (y; p)
can be identi…ed with the probability simplex over the alternatives y; y; and B. Denote this set by y; B; y and note that, as in the case of 3-outcome lotteries, the set is 2-dimensional. Also note that, for any increasing vNM utility u 2 U, …rst-order stochastic dominance implies u y < u (B) < u ( y) (where u (B) stands for the expected utility of B).
Hence, assuming that more money is better, all core EU preferences over y; B; y are comonotonic.
Finally, to be able to use Proposition 4 we need to demonstrate that, for every u 2 U, indi¤erence curves of the derived expected utility preference are parallel straight lines. This, however, is implied by the Independence axiom (as it enables us to replace the lottery B by its certainty equivalent u 1 (u (B)); the formal development of this claim is omitted due to space where (p q) denotes the observed proportion of choices of p over q for some sample of pairwise choices (and similarly for the other pairs). Thus, satisfaction of WST, expressed in terms of the theoretical probability ( ), is not su¢ cient for an analogous condition where ( ) is replaced by the proportion function ( ) : However, if WST is satis…ed and the observed data form an independent and identically distributed random sample, then the WST condition for the proportion function ( ) will be satis…ed asymptotically.
$-bet versus P-bet type experiments
In this section we examine the implications of our analysis for an experiment that exhibits the "preference reversal phenomenon" (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971 , Lindman 1971 , Grether and Plott 1979 . Two lotteries are presented to experimental subjects. A '$-bet' o¤ers a relatively high payo¤, denoted by x 1 ; with a relatively small probability, denoted by p 1 : In a typical experiment, p 1 is well below 0.5. A 'P-bet'o¤ers a relatively small payo¤, denoted by x 2 ; with a relatively high probability, denoted by p 2 . The probability of winning for the P-bet is higher than the probability of winning for the $-bet: p 2 > p 1 : In the experiment, certainty equivalents (CEs) of the $-bet and P-bet are elicited from the subjects. We denote these certainty equivalents by CE $ and CE P ; respectively. Most experimental subjects choose the P-bet over the S-bet while revealing a strictly higher certainty equivalent for the $-bet than for the P-bet. Thus, a typical ordering of the certain outcomes is as follows;
For this setting, the overall space can be identi…ed with the space (0;
where (0; x 1 ; x 2 ) denotes the probability simplex over alternatives 0; x 1 ; and x 2 ; and [0;
is the range of possible certainty equivalents: But this implies that lotteries are drawn from a space that is at least three dimensional. It then follows from the results in the preceding sections and the example in the Appendix that our model does not preclude violations of WST in this case.
Our …ndings are in concert with the relatively high frequency of cycles reported for a variety of $-bet versus P-bet type experiments (see, e.g., Loomes Starmer and Sugden 1991). Note, however, that most studies of the preference reversal phenomenon do not involve repeated choices or have too few repetitions. This makes it often impossible to assess whether individual subjects satisfy WST.
WST with core non-EU preferences
In this section we provide further results for lottery sets that are two dimensional (n = 3) but where PDMs have certain types of non-EU core preferences. Some of the results we obtain here are for a framework with three outcomes where L is the two dimensional unit simplex.
However, there are other cases of interest that fall under the category of two dimensional lotteries. For example, consider a world that has two possible states of nature s 1 and s 2 with the corresponding …xed probabilities p 1 and p 2 . Here the probabilities are …xed but the outcomes z i can vary, and lotteries are given by the pairs (z 1 ; z 2 ). Since there is a one-to-one correspondence between this space and the set of lotteries L in our basic setup, our results apply to this case.
Three monetary outcomes and betweenness preferences
By Propositions 4 and 5, a PDM satis…es WST if all core EU preferences are either comonotonic or share the same risk attitude. We now extend these results by relaxing the assumption that core preferences are of the EU type. We say that a PDM has core Betweenness preferences if there exists a set of transitive Betweenness functionals fV g 2T such that each satis…es and hence the following relationship holds
By construction, all dual EU preferences are increasing with respect to the relation of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Risk aversion is characterized by the convexity of the function f , which in our case is equivalent to f total pro…tability of the company and, as a result, the team's preference ranking respected monotonicity with respect to the total pro…ts on each occasion a decision was made. This, of course, does not imply that the options A; B, and C will be ranked similarly on all choice occasions. Feasible core preferences may have di¤erent attitudes to risk and, consequently, rank the three options di¤erently.
The probability distributions over the total pro…ts for the three options are given by:
Thus, e¤ectively there are three outcomes, -$4m, $4m, $12m, under this scenario and the three options correspond to di¤erent probability distributions over these three outcomes.
In addition, all of the core preferences are comonotonic. It then follows immediately from Proposition 4 that WST will be satis…ed. 17 The corresponding implication for the example's interpretation in terms of the Condorcet procedure is that the procedure will be void of Condorcet cycles (in the limit) as long as all of the voting members of the team care only about the total pro…ts.
Suppose now that appeal of di¤erent options does not stem solely from the likelihoods of the total pro…ts. Rather, some core preferences put more weight on the tablet pro…ts while others favor the division that produces the phones. Under this scenario and absent any additional information, one cannot reduce the set of relevant outcomes to three as in the previous scenario and all twelve outcome pairs should be considered. But then our arguments and the second example in subsection 4.1 imply that even if all core preferences were comonotonic and had similar risk attitudes, a violation of WST would be possible.
Correspondingly, the Condorcet procedure may exhibit cycles and there may very well be room for agenda setting. 17 If the team members disagree on the probabilities of the respective outcomes then the chances of violating WST increase. However, as long as these disagreements are not severe, our commonality and dimensionality restrictions still apply. 
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1: The 'if'part is immediate and its proof is omitted. To simplify the exposition, we normalize the utilities such that they all belong to H = fy 2 R n j P y i = 0g.
If is empty then (2) trivially holds for U =H. Hence, assume that is non-empty and note that, by (A.3), the relation satis…es the Independence assumption: that is, for all p; q; r 2 L and 2 (0; 1],
Now …x a lottery q in the interior of L and consider the set
Note that for all p 2 L, p q , p q 2 W (q). One direction in this equivalence follows from the de…nition of W (q) by taking = 1. Clearly (A.4) yields the convexity of the strictly positive cone W (q). To show that W (q) is independent of q for interior points of L, consider q; q 0 ; p 2 L such that q; q 0 are interior points and p q. By construction, there exists q 00 2 L and 2 (0; 1) such that q 0 = q + (1 ) q 00 . Denote p 0 = p + (1 ) q 00 and note that, by (6),
Note that for a boundary point q (of L) we would still have W (q) W (q 0 ).
Being a strictly positive convex cone in H, W (q) is equal to the intersection of a family of open half spaces fr 2 Hju r < 0g u2U , where U H is a uniquely de…ned strictly positive closed convex cone (see Rockafellar 1970) . That is,
Hence, for all p 2 L, p q () 8u 2 U : u p < u q and, by taking negations and using (A.1),
Proof of Theorem 2: The 'if'part is immediate and its proof is omitted. The proof of the converse is similar to that of Theorem 1. If is empty then (4) trivially holds for U q =H, for all q 2 L. Hence assume that is non-empty and note that (B.3) is equivalent to the following: for all p; q 2 L, r = p; q and 2 (0; 1],
As in the former proof, …x a lottery q in the interior of L, consider the set To prove the right-hand side equivalence of (4) let p 2 L be an interior point satisfying To conclude, note that continuity implies the equivalence for non-interior points.
Continuous example of necessity of condition n 3 in Proposition 4 for WST:
Suppose that n = 4 and utility vectors are drawn from a uniform probability distribution and the set U is given by a triangle with the following vertices: Note that the utility of the worst outcome is set to 0 while the utility of the best outcome is set to 1: Given that these preferences respect monotonicity with regard to …rst-order stochastic dominance, these restrictions are without any loss of generality. Figure 4 depicts the projection of the support of the probability distribution into the space of intermediate utility levels (the second and third components of the utility vectors). Since the triangle in Figure 4 lies entirely above the 45 0 line, all of the utility vectors in U satisfy monotonicity with respect to …rst-order stochastic dominance.
Place Figure 4 here
Consider the following set of lotteries: The probability (p i p j ) that lottery p i is preferred to lottery p j has a simple graphical representation under monotonicity and four possible outcomes. For our example, the vertical straight line at u 2 = 0:5 in Figure 4 represents the set of vectors (u 2 ; u 3 ) for which the expected utility of lottery p 1 is equal to the expected utility of lottery p 3 : Moreover, Thus, the probability distribution violates WST for lotteries p 1 ; p 2 ; and p 3 : In this example, all preference structures in the support of the uniform probability distribution are comonotonic. However, since there are four possible outcomes we were able to …nd a probability distribution that led to a violation of WST with respect to P. Similar examples can be constructed for sets P of higher dimensions.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider a comonotonic PDM. Without any loss of generality assume that for all u 2 U, u (x 1 ) > u (x 2 ) > u (x 3 ) and that U H = fy 2 R 3 j P y i = 0g.
Since all u satisfy u e 1 > u e 3 , U is a subset of the half plane fy 2 Hj (e A contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Consider a risk averse PDM. Without loss of generality assume that U H = fy 2 R 3 j P y i = 0g and that x 1 > x 2 > x 3 . Let t 2 (0; 1) satisfy tx 1 +
(1 t) x 3 = x 2 and consider the lotteries e 2 and q = (t; 0; 1 t) (the lottery that yields x 1 with probability t and x 3 with probability (1 t)) in L. By risk aversion, every EU preference with utility in U prefers to move from q to e 2 , hence U is a subset of the half plane fy 2 Hj (e 2 q) y 0g. Then, follow the proof of Proposition 4.
The case of a risk seeking PDM is similar.
Proof of Proposition 6: Assume, by way negation, that WST is violated. Hence there exists a triplet of Betweenness functionals fV
and lotteries fp; q; rg that satisfy the following rankings
By betweenness, the corresponding local utilities u Hence, a PDM with core EU preferences de…ned by u 0 Figure 1 The utility cones U' , U'' and U''', of the points q', q'' and q''', respectively, are depicted . 
